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Abstract —In the Smart Grid with Renewable Energy 
Resources (RERs), the Residential Units (RUs) with Distributed 
Energy Resources (DERs) are considered to be both power 
consumers and suppliers. Specifically, RUs with excessive 
renewable generations can trade with the utility in deficit of 
power supplies for mutual benefits. It causes two challenging 
issues. First, the trading data of RUs is quite sensitive, which 
should be only accessed by authorized users with fine-grained 
policies. Second, the behaviors of the RUs to generate trading 
data are spontaneous and unpredictable, then the problem is how 
to guarantee system efficiency and delay tolerance 
simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a delay-tolerant 
flexible data access control scheme based on Key Policy Attribute 
Based Encryption (KP-ABE) for Smart Grid with Renewable 
Energy Resources (RERs). We adopt the secret sharing scheme 
(SSS) to realize a flexible access control with encryption delay 
tolerance. Furthermore, there is no central trusted server to 
perform the encryption/decryption. We reduce the computation 
cost on RUs and operators via a semi-trusted model. The analysis 
shows that the proposed scheme can meet the data security 
requirement of the Smart Grid with RERs, and it also has less 
cost compared with other popular models. 
 
Index Terms—Smart Grid, Renewable Energy Resources, 
KP-ABE, Secret Sharing Scheme, Delay tolerance. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
nergy crisis and environmental pollution have become two 
critical concerns during the last decade. Smart Grid with 
Renewable Energy Resources (RERs) is a promising approach 
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to tackle these two problems [1]. RERs are inexhaustible, 
including light, wind, vibration, heat, biofuel, biomass, and 
tides. Encouraging and supporting the use of renewable energy 
power generation technologies, can substantially reduce 
standard high energy and carbon emission. In the Smart Grid, a 
two-way communication between the utility and the customers 
is achieved with the support of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) [2]. As shown in Fig.1, in 
Smart Grid with RERs, renewable distributed energy 
resources (DERs) at the consumer side will become an 
important part of power generation. With the consideration of 
DERs’ advantages and benefits, Residential Units (RUs) that 
are equipped with DERs will supplement their daily electricity 
demands and assist in reducing the pressure on the main grid 
during peak hours. If there is any electricity generation excess, 
RUs also can sell the surplus of clean energy to the main grid 
for a certain income by acting as small-scale electricity 
suppliers (SESs) [3]. 
 
Fig.1. The architecture of Smart Grid with RERs 
Those RUs will send their price and bid information to the 
power network. If their prices are competitive enough, the 
network operator will decide to trade with them. Therefore, it 
is important to ensure that the individual price is unknown to 
each other, to avoid a malicious low-price competition. Thus, 
the Smart Grid is expected to provide security to the 
transmitted information. As far as we know, Attribute Based 
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Encryption (ABE) [4] has been already used in various 
practical scenarios in order to achieve the data security and 
realize a fine-grained access control.  
In this paper, the information from the same area is 
considered to share similar attributes, and the agency operators 
(AOs) are allowed to have the authority to specify access 
policies. Therefore, the Key Policy Attribute Based 
Encryption (KP-ABE) [5], an important variant of ABE, is a 
better choice. Actually, these RUs with DERs that share the 
same attributes may belong to the same micro-grid, which is 
not the focus of this paper. Therefore, this is not addressed in 
this paper. 
When the AOs require the bid information to be checked, 
there are typically several methods to choose from. One of the 
intuitive methods is to set a central trusted server to collect all 
of the bid information from the corresponding bidders. 
Generally, as the RUs’ trading behaviors are difficult to 
predict, the central trusted server will set a transaction period, 
during which any received information is considered valid and 
any information that misses the deadline will be deemed void. 
The drawback of this is that the AOs can only request 
decryption after this period is over. Alternatively, we can 
abandon the central trusted server, making it possible that each 
set of RUs can independently encrypt its information. This 
method greatly reduces the waiting time of the AOs. However, 
it will result in frequent decryptions. 
Both of the above methods will cause varying degrees of 
computation overhead. To solve this problem, we propose a 
flexible access control scheme with delay tolerance. The main 
contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows: 
⚫ We propose a scheme that allows some of the RUs that have 
generated information in a short time to first encrypt and 
upload, while other RUs’ operations can be delayed. This 
can reduce the AOs’ waiting time for decryption. As a result, 
all of these ciphertexts can be obtained indiscriminately by 
AOs and decrypted once rather than multiple times. 
⚫ By combing the KP-ABE and secret sharing scheme (SSS), 
we achieve a secure and flexible access control scheme with 
delay tolerance. In this paper, there is no central trusted 
server to participate in encryption/decryption, we replace 
the trusted ones with the semi-trusted. They assist with 
calculation and reducing the computation cost on RUs and 
AOs without impacting the data security. 
⚫ We show the security proof and analysis, which 
demonstrate that the proposed scheme can fulfill the 
security requirements in a practical scenario. Compared 
with the traditional schemes, the experimental results 
indicate that our scheme can effectively reduce the time cost 
and improve system efficiency. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
related work is introduced. In Section III, the preliminaries are 
given. In Section IV, the system model and security model are 
described. In Section V, we present the details of the proposed 
scheme. In Section VI and VII, its security analysis and 
performance evaluation are conducted, respectively. Section 
VIII concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
With the gradual improvement of Smart Grid construction, 
energy consumption and environment pollution have attracted 
attention and become widely studied. Many researchers 
believe that Smart Grid integrated with the RER is the best 
way at present. Sims et al. presented the carbon emission and 
mitigation cost comparisons between the traditional energy 
resources and renewable energy resources [6]. Yu et al. 
focused on several communication technologies available for 
Smart Grid with RER [7]. Other relevant research details are 
described in [8-9]. 
Another important concept in this paper is DER, which 
means the small power generators typically located at the 
users' sites. The generated energy can meet the growing 
customer needs more or less [10]. Due to the development of 
RER technologies, there is plenty of literature on the 
combination of DER and RER, such as [11]. 
No matter whether using the traditional grid or the emerging 
Smart Grid with RER, data security and user privacy always 
present some challenging issues. Thus, there have been 
considerable research efforts to understand the definition and 
future development of Smart Grid [12]. This research 
primarily summarizes the current Smart Grid technologies and 
the key issues by pointing out the important significance 
of improving system reliability and ensuring data security in 
Smart Grid. In [13], Xu et al. listed the security challenges and 
analyzed the attack risks, and then proposed a variety of 
defense strategies. There are some other related work 
considering the security issues, such as [14-18]. In order to 
address variety of security issues, many cryptographic 
schemes have been proposed. Here we only introduce three 
essential kinds of techniques. 
A.Homomorphic Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption allows arithmetic operations to 
be performed on ciphertext and gives the same result as if the 
same arithmetic operation is done on the plaintext [19]. It has 
been viewed as one of the promising methods to be employed 
in Smart Grid to provide data security and privacy preserving. 
He et al. introduced an application of public key encryption of 
Smart Grid in [20]. They adopted the partially homomorphic 
encryption algorithm to protect the data exchange process 
between consumers and utilities.   
B.Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) 
ABE [4] is often applied to the Smart Grid; it could not only 
provide the data security, but can also achieve the fine-grained 
data access control. The key features of ABE are as follows: 
first, the identities of the encrypted data are expressed by 
several descriptive attributes. Second, as long as the number of 
matching attributes reach the specified threshold, the 
ciphertexts can be decrypted.  
There are two important variants of ABE: One is KP-ABE 
that is proposed by Goyal et al. in [5], they developed this new 
cryptosystem based on Sahai’s work [4]. In their scheme, the 
ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes. Users define 
the access policies, and the attributes in an access policy are 
  
organized into a tree structure (described as access tree). The 
other one is Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption 
(CP-ABE) proposed by Bethencourt in [21]. In their work, the 
data owner constructs the access tree using visitors’ identity 
information. The user can decrypt the ciphertext only if the 
attributes in their private key match the access tree. Fadlullah 
et al. focused on the applicability of KP-ABE in Smart Grid in 
[22]. They considered to use KP-ABE to broadcast a single 
encrypted message to a specific group of users, which ensured 
the system’s efficiency and communication security 
simultaneously.The latest researches on ABE can be access in 
[23-25]. 
C.Secret sharing scheme (SSS) 
SSS is a hot spot of cryptography; it is used for sharing a 
secret among a group of parties, each of whom only obtain a 
piece of the secret (namely a share of the secret). The most 
basic secret sharing scheme is first proposed by Shamir [26]. 
In his paper, no single party could infer any information about 
the secret with its own share. The only way to reconstruct the 
secret is to combine a certain number of shares. After Shamir’s 
work, there were many practical schemes being proposed to 
adapt to various scenarios, including [27-30]. 
Despite the large number of research that focus on a variety 
of security issues, no one has taken the system efficiency and 
user delay-tolerance into consideration. In this paper, to 
improve the flexibility of the system and realize the 
fine-grained access control, we combine KP-ABE [5] with the 
scheme proposed by Pedersen [30], which requires all 
participants to complete the encryption without a trusted third 
party. 
II. PRELIMINARY 
A. Bilinear Maps 
Let G0 and G1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime 
order p and g be the generator of G0. The bilinear map e 
is, 0 0 1:e G G G → , for all , pa b :  
⚫ Bilinearity： 1, , ( , ) ( , )
a b abu v G e u v e u v  = . 
⚫ Non-degeneracy： ( , ) 1e g g  . 
⚫ Symmetric： ( , ) ( , ) ( , )a b ab b ae g g e g g e g g= = . 
B. Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: 
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p and g 
be its generator. Given a tuple ,
xg g  , where Rg G and 
Px  are chosen as input uniformly at random, the DL 
problem is to recover x. 
Definition 1 The DL assumption held in G is that no 
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm  can solve the 
DL problem with negligible advantage. We define the 
advantage of as follows: 
Pr[ , ]xg g x =  
The probability is taken over by the generator g, randomly 
chosen x, and the random bits consumed by . 
C. The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) 
Assumption 
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p and g 
be its generator. Let , , Pa b c  be chosen randomly. Given 
two tuples, where 
, , , ( , )a b c abcA g B g C g e g g = = =  , 
, , , ( , )a b c zA g B g C g e g g = = =  . 
 Definition 2 The decisional BDH assumption holds only 
when there is not a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm  
that is able to distinguish the two above with more than a 
negligible advantage. The advantage is  
Pr[ ( , , , ( , ) ) 0] Pr[ ( , , , ( , ) ) 0]abc zA B C e g g A B C e g g= − =  
where the probability is taken over the random parameters g, a, 
b, c and the random bits consumed by . 
D. Symmetric Encryption  
In a symmetric encryption scheme, two probabilistic 
polynomial time (PPT) algorithms exist: Enc(K, m)→C, 
which maps a symmetric key K   and a 
message {0.1}*m to the ciphertext C, and Dec(C, K)→m, 
retrieving the message m with symmetric key K. 
The security game is described as follows: An adversary 
submits two messages m0 and m1 with the same length to the 
challenger. Then, the challenger randomly flips a coin b and 
encrypted mb with a symmetric key that K  . The ciphertext 
will be transmitted to the adversary, and he/she gives a guess 
b’ about b. 
Definition 3 The one-time symmetric encryption scheme is 
semantically secure only when for any PPT adversary, 
( ) Pr[  ' ]Adv wins b b = =  
is negligible in  . 
E. Access Structure in Key-policy Attribute Based Encryption 
Definition 4 Let 1 2{ , ,..., }nP P P P=  be a set of participants 
and let 1 2{ , ,..., }2 nP P PU =  be the universal set. If \{ }AS U    , 
then AS can be viewed as an access structure. 
If , ,A AS B U A B    , and B AS  , AS is considered to 
be a monotonic access structure. The sets in AS are defined as 
authorized sets, while the other sets are regarded as 
unauthorized sets. 
⚫ Construction for the access tree 
In a KP-ABE scheme, let be the access tree and all of the 
interior nodes represent the threshold value (including the root 
node ), such as AND (n of n), OR (1 of n), and n of m (m>n). 
Set kx denotes the threshold of node x. Define some functions, 
parent(x), denoting the parent node of node x, index(x) returns 
the number associated with the node x, where the index 
uniquely assigned to nodes, att(x) is used only if x is a leaf 
  
node and returns the attribute associated with the leaf node x in 
the tree. At the beginning of the encryption, the algorithm 
randomly chooses a secret number s and conducts a 
polynomial for each interior node from top to bottom. 
⚫ Satisfy the tree 
The tree is constructed from top to bottom within the 
encryption, while the decryption order is reverse. 
When some users require ciphertext decryption, they have 
to start from the leaves nodes. To retrieve the secret, we define 
the Lagrange coefficient ,i S , for pi  , and for x S  , 
, ( ) ,i S x j S j i
x j
i j =
−
 =
−

. 
F.  (t, n) Threshold Secret Sharing 
The most basic secret sharing scheme is the (t, n) threshold 
scheme, which was first proposed by Shamir [26]. In this paper, 
we adopt the scheme proposed by Pedersen [30]. Assume that 
there are n parties: P1, P2,..., Pn in the system and the threshold 
is t. All of the parties select a unique random number xi as the 
individual identity and broadcast to the public. Each party Pi 
chooses a number si at random as his personal secret, and thus 
the total secret can be obtained by computing is s=  . Each 
party Pi constructs a polynomial ( )if x for the other parties, 
which has a degree of t-1 and (0)i if s= . These polynomials 
are distributed to other n-1 parties independently. Additionally, 
the personal secret si is secure as it is polynomially 
indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. 
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL 
A.System Model 
Consider that in certain areas, there may be large number of 
smart communities. Each of them involves a large number of 
RUs. Generally, the generated information of those RUs in the 
same community share the same attributes. We set a 
semi-trusted central aggregator (CA) in charge of assisting 
encryption. All of the encrypted bid information is sent to the 
network via CA. It first collects all the data from RUs. When 
the number of RUs reaches the threshold, it will perform 
calculation on them and send them to the network. The 
delayed encrypted data will be sent to the network via CA in 
chronological order. When it comes to decryption, the agency 
operators (AO) will deal with the trading information via the 
central dispatcher (CD). AOs can construct the access 
structures that consist of the attributes of the specified bid 
information. As soon as there is an operator that requires the 
decryption of ciphertexts, CD performs the pre-decryption 
beforehand. 
B.Security Assumption 
In this paper, the security assumption of the entities is 
defined as follows. The CA and CD are always online and 
assist with encryption/decryption. Both of them are considered 
to be “honest-but-curious”. Neither can collude with the RUs, 
because in a real scenario, any of the RUs can be the bid 
information owner and the collusion may threaten the 
individual benefit. The RUs generate and encrypt their own 
bid information to trade the electricity, however, they tend to 
be curious about others’ information, as it is highly beneficial. 
In addition, there may be some unauthorized operators 
colluding to obtain illegal access authority. For instance, if 
operator A has the key associated with the access structure “X 
AND Y”, and operator B has the key associated with the access 
structure “Y AND Z”, it is illegal for them to collude to 
decrypt a ciphertext whose only attribute is Y.  
C.Security Model  
Here, we introduce the universal security model of our 
system, which is defined similar to Goyal’s scheme in [5]. In 
this security model, there is an adversary  and a challenger . 
The adversary is allowed to select a set of attributes and 
challenge on an encryption to the access structure AS* and 
query for any secret key SK. The challenger is responsible for 
the ciphertext generation under the AS* and the secret key 
generation. The security game is described as follows: 
Initial: The adversary  first selects a set of attributes 
 and sends it to the challenger .
Setup: The challenger  runs this Setup algorithm to 
generate all of the public keys and master keys.  
Phase 1 The adversary  issues queries for repeated private 
keys for various access structure ASi. If for , ii AS  , then 
the queries are aborted. Else, generates the corresponding 
secret keys for .  
Challenge The adversary submits two messages with equal 
length, M0 and M1. The challenger  randomly flips a coin b, 
and encrypts Mb with the selected set  . Then, the generated 
ciphertext CT* will be given to . 
Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1. 
Guess: The adversary outputs its guess ' {0,1}b  for b 
and wins the game if and only if 'b b= . 
The advantage of an adversary in this game is defined as,  
1( ) Pr[ ' ]
2
Adv b b= = − , 
where the probability is taken over the random bits used by the 
challenger and the adversary. 
Definition 5 A KP-ABE scheme is secure in the 
Selective-Set model of security if all polynomial time 
adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the 
Selective-Set game. 
Definition 6 A KP-ABE scheme is CPA-secure if 
challengers allow for decryption queries in Phase 1 and Phase 
2. 
III.DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
A. Overview 
In this paper, the overview of our system is shown in Fig. 2.  
The CA will be based on the actual situation to develop a 
transaction period. Only the information submitted within this 
period shall be deemed valid, otherwise, it will be considered 
invalid. The threshold value that determines the number of 
RUs uploading their information can be specified by the 
  
system operators in advance according to the actual needs. 
Once the number of trading RUs reaches the threshold value, 
they can begin to encrypt and upload. Then, the CA will be 
ready for receiving the semi-finished ciphertext from the RUs 
and converting them into finished ones. However, the CA is 
not involved in the encryption of plaintexts. As long as the AO 
sends his/her request for ciphertexts, the CD obtains the 
desired ciphertexts and pre-decrypts for the AO without 
detecting any plaintexts information.  
 
Fig.2. System Model 
B.Algorithms 
Here we will give the details of the algorithms in our 
system. 
1) Setup 
This setup algorithm will choose a bilinear group 0G of 
prime order p with generator g. Assume that the universe of 
attributes in the system: {1,2,..., }n= . For i  , the 
algorithm will associate this attribute with a unique element 
it in 
*
p and choose two random exponents： , py   . The 
public key and the master key are published as: 
 11 ,..., , ( , ) , ,tt yPK T g T g Y e g g A g= = = = =  (1) 
 1 2, ... , , .MK t t t y =        (2) 
2) Key Generation 
This operation is implemented by a specific trusted server 
independently. It is responsible for registering legal AOs, 
authorizing the access policies, and generating the secret keys 
SKs accordingly.  
This algorithm will construct an access tree for the 
authorized access structure AS. It takes the access structure 
and the master key as inputs, and outputs a private key for the 
AO. The ciphertexts can only be decrypted by the key owner if 
their attributes satisfy the tree. All of the steps are similar with 
that of [5]. After constructing the access tree, for each leaf 
node x, the key components are computed as follows: 
(0)
,  ( ).
x
i
q
t
xD g where i att x= =        (3) 
Thus, the user’s decryption key is,  : , xD D .                                                       
3) Encryption 
The RUs’ bid information should be transmitted over the 
network securely. The best situation is that all of the potential 
trading RUs generate their own bid information, which can be 
packed and encrypted together as one ciphertext. However, 
in a real scenario, it is possible for there to be only a few RUs 
generating their bid information over a period of time. In this 
paper, we allow the latency of some RUs’ encryption.  
The encryption operation is performed by the CA and 
several RUs that belong to the same community. First, the CA 
will set a transaction period. In this period of time, k RUs 
( 0 k n  , k denotes the threshold value that can be specified 
by the system in advance, n denotes the total number of RUs in 
the current area.) have generated their data, and the CA will 
first inform all those RUs to generate a polynomial ( )if x by 
themselves, which the degree is k-1. Each of the RUs will 
choose at random a number i ps  and set 
(0) ,i if s=            (4) 
1 1
(0).
n n
i i
i i
s s f
= =
= =          (5) 
Additionally, all of the RUs in the same area will obtain a 
symmetric encryption key from a specific trusted server that 
is totally unknown to the CA. 
RUi  computes with  as follows: 
' .i
s
Y g=
           
(6) 
Then set the ciphertext id as CIDi : 
( ').iCID Enc Y=
         
(7) 
Then, it will broadcast its CIDi to the other n-1 RUs. As long 
as it obtains others’ CID, for
 
1 , ,j n j i    computes 
( )i jf CID and sends it to RUj. 
When RUi gets all the ( )j if CID from the other RUs 
( 1 , ,j n j i    ), it will set a new function: 
1( ) ( ) ... ( ) ... ( ).i i i i i n ih CID f CID f CID f CID= + +     (8) 
Then, the algorithm will encrypt the RU’s bid information. 
For the attributes set  , computing as follows: 
'ˆ ( , ) ( , ) ,i issi i iC M e g g M e g g
= =
     
(9) 
( )( , ) ,i iyh CIDiC e g g=         
(10) 
( )
, .i i
h CID
u i u uC T =         
(11) 
Thus, the semi-finished ciphertext is: 
'
,
ˆ' , , ,{ } .i i i u i uC C C C  =       (12) 
All the k semi-finished ciphertexts from the RUs will be 
transmitted to the CA. Once it obtains k ciphertexts, it 
performs the polynomial interpolation as follows:
 
  
1,
1 1,
( )
1
( ( ) )
( , ) ( , )
              = ( , ) .
k
j
j ij j ii i
kk
j
i i
j ii j j i
CID
k
CID CIDys yh CID
i
CID
y h CID
CID CID
e g g e g g
e g g
= 
= = 
−
=
−

=
 

    
(13) 
The ciphertexts are changed to
 ,
ˆ, ,{ }i i i t tC C C  = where 
ˆ ( , ) ( , ) .is ysi iC M e g g e g g
=
      
(14) 
They will be transmitted to the network. In the near future, 
there may be other RUs generating information in succession, 
performing the same operation as above, and submitting the 
semi-finished ciphertexts to the CA. While the CA does not 
need to do anything except that: ˆ ( , ) ( , ) .is ysi iC M e g g e g g
= . 
As ( , )yse g g
 
is known. 
4) Decryption 
When the AO requires to view the bid information of some 
certain area, they tend to obtain and access all the RUs’ 
information at once. First, he/she will submit the request for 
decryption and get l ( )k l n   ciphertexts via CD. It will 
pre-decrypt the ciphertexts by querying the symmetric key of 
the area. For 1 i m   , 
' ( ) ,i
s
iY Dec CID g= =
                           
(15) 
ˆ ( , ) ( , )
( , ) .
( , ) ( , )
i
i i
s ys
i i ys
is s
C M e g g e g g
M e g g
e g g e g g

 
= =
    
(16) 
The ciphertexts are changed to
 ,, ,{ }i i u i uC C C  = where 
( , ) .ysi iC M e g g=                               (17) 
Thus, as soon as he/she gains l ( )k l n   ciphertexts from 
the network, he/she selects k of them and computes as follows: 
1,
1 1,
( )
1
( ( ) )
      .
k
j
i i
j ij j i
kk
j
i i
j ii j j i
CID
h CIDk
CID CIDs
u u
i
CID
h CID
CID CID
u
T T
T
= 
= = 
−
=
−

=
 
=

                (18) 
After that, the AO decrypts the ciphertexts as the authors did 
in [5]. First, for i   , 
(0)
(0)( , ) ( , ) ,
z
u zu
q
t s q ste g g e g g=                    (19) 
( )
, ' (0)
, ' (0)(0)
( ( )) , ' (0)
, ' (0)( )
(0)
,  ( ), ' { ( ) : }
   ( ( , ) )
   ( ( , ) )
   ( , )
   ( , ) .
parent z
x
i S x
x z
z Sx
i Sq s xz
z Sx
sq index z i S x
z Sx
i Ssq i x
z Sx
yqx
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(20) 
For root node R, 
( , ) .ysRF e g g=                                      
(21) 
By this method, the message can be decrypted together at 
one-time: 
(1 )
( , )
( , )
ys
i
i i m ys
M e g g
M
e g g
  =
                        
(22) 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
We analyze the security properties of our system 
considering the security model defined in this Section. 
A. System Security 
We prove the security of our scheme according to the 
security model defined in Section III. 
Theorem 1. When the Decisional BDH assumption holds, 
there is no adversary that can break our scheme in the 
Attribute-based Selective-Set Model. 
Proof: We prove this theorem by the following game. 
Suppose an adversary  can attack our scheme in 
Selective-Set model with non-negligible advantage. 
Suppose there is a Challenger  that can play the Decisional 
BDH game with the advantage  . The game proceeds as 
follows: 
As for the challenger, let G1 and G2 be the bilinear map with 
the generator g. Then he/she flips a coin c. If c=0, the 
challenger sets , , , ( , )
a b c abcA g B g C g Z e g g = = = =  ; 
otherwise, it sets , , , ( , )
a b c zA g B g C g Z e g g = = = =   for 
random a, b, c, z.  
Init: The adversary  first selects a set of attributes  and 
send it to the challenger .
Setup: The challenger  runs this algorithm. The challenger 
first sets the parameter ( , ) ( , )abY e A B e g g= = . For  i   , 
it selects at random a number i pr  and sets
ir
iT g= ; 
otherwise it chooses a random i p  and sets 
i ib
iT g B
 = = . Then, it gives the public parameters PK to the 
adversary and keeps MK to itself. 
Phase 1 The adversary  issues queries for repeated private 
keys for various access structure ASi. If for , ii AS  , then 
the queries are aborted. Otherwise, generates the 
corresponding secret keys for . Based on the previous 
definition, set the private key as: 
(0) (0) (0)
(0) (0) (0)
if  
otherwise
x x x
i i i
x x x
i i i
Q bq bq
t r r
x Q bq q
t b
g g B i
D
g g B
 


= = 
= 

= =
 
Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1. 
Challenge The adversary submits two messages with equal 
lengths, M0 and M1. The challenger  randomly flips a coin b, 
and encrypts Mb with the selected set  . Then, the generated 
ciphertext ( , ' ,{ } )i
r
b i iE E m Z E C  = = = will be given to . 
Guess The adversary will submit a guess b’ of b. If b’=b the 
challenger will output u’=0 to indicate that it was a BDH tuple, 
otherwise it was a random tuple. In the case where u=1, the 
adversary gains no information about b. Therefore,  
  
1 1Pr[ ' | 1] ,Pr[ ' | 1]
2 2
b b u u u u = = = = = .
 
If u=0, the adversary sees an encryption of Mb. The 
advantage is  by definition. Therefore, 
1 1Pr[ ' | 0] ,Pr[ ' | 0]
2 2
b b u u u u = = = + = = = + .
 
Thus, the overall advantage of the challenger in the DBDH 
game is, 
1 1 1 1Pr[ ' | 0] Pr[ ' | 1]
2 2 2 2
u u u u u u = = + = = − = . 
B. Security against Ciphertext Confusion  
For reason of individual benefits, some AOs intend to 
collect a few ciphertexts from different areas or different 
communities, which they may share some of the same 
attributes. The half-decrypted ciphertexts will be as follows: 
( )
,( , ) , .i i
h CIDys
i u i u uM e g g C T =  
However, they cannot gain any information even though 
they perform the polynomial interpolation, where 
1 1,, ,
( ( ) )
'
kk
j
i i
j ii j j iu i u i
CID
h CID
CID CIDt t sg g= = 
−
 
= . 
It is difficult to get the right s, therefore they cannot gain 
more information by confusing the ciphertexts. 
C. Selection of Participants 
 
In both Shamir’s scheme [26] and Pedersen’s scheme
 
[30],
 
note that 2 1k n−  , as the (k, n) threshold schemes allow at 
most k-1 cheating participants. This means that a majority of 
the participants are assumed to be honest. However, in this 
paper, all of the RUs prefer to be able to upload their bid 
information accurately, as this concerns individual benefits. It 
is profitable for none in cheating each other. 
Therefore, we relax the restriction of k; its value is 
determined by the actual number of RUs that upload 
information. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A.  Numerical analysis 
In this paper, not all of the RUs need to to submit the 
ciphertexts at the same time, but some RUs need to submit 
ciphertext first, while the other ciphertexts can be delayed. 
Furthermore, there is not a central trusted server waiting for a 
long time to collect all these ciphertexts. As a result, we 
shorten the time that the AOs wait for decryption, and they do 
not need to decrypt repeatedly to get the ciphertext. Now, we 
give the efficiency analysis according to the 
encryption/decryption process. The time cost in each step is 
shown in Table I.  
Generally, there are two intuitive schemes for RUs to 
upload their information to the network. One is to set a trusted 
CA, and it will set a transaction period TP. During that period 
of time, the RUs can upload their information independently. 
After time is over, the CA no longer collects information, and 
it will package all of the information, encrypt them together, 
and send the ciphertext to the network. Assume that in TP, 
there are t RUs uploading their information, and for ease of 
description, we set each of the information size is m, the 
encryption time for all of this information is t mET  , and the 
total encryption/decryption time are T1, T1’. Thus, the results 
are, 
1 t mT TP ET = +                        (23) 
1 ' t mT DT =                                           
(24) 
TABLE I.  THE PARAMETERS IN PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 
 Symbols Description 
       n Total number of RUs 
      TP A transaction period that set by system/CA. 
       t Total number of users who upload their information in TP. 
      ET Encryption time of data with KP-ABE. 
      DT Decryption time of data with KP-ABE. 
      ST Time for performing the secret sharing scheme. 
    DST Time for solving the secret sharing polynomials. 
       T Total time for encryption. 
       T’ Total time for decryption. 
To abolish the trusted CA, RUs only need to encrypt their 
information independently and then send the ciphertexts to 
network. Similarly, the system can set a transaction period TP 
for RUs. Once the time is over, their submitted information is 
considered as invalid. Thus, the total encryption time 2T  
is approximately equal to TP. 
2T TP=                                           
(25) 
If there are t RUs uploading their information, each of the 
ciphertexts size is m. This means that, in order to obtain all of 
the bid information, the AOs have to repeat the decryption t 
times. Thus, the total decryption time 2 'T is that: 
2 ' mT t DT=                                       
(26) 
What we can conclude from those schemes is as follows: 
For Scheme 1, only when the encryption is done completely 
by the CA, can AOs send requests for decryption. Obviously, 
this scheme requires a trusted CA and results in a long waiting 
time for AOs. 
For Scheme 2, without a CA being responsible for 
collecting and encrypting the RUs’ information, the RUs 
perform the encryption independently. But this means that the 
AOs have to decrypt repeatedly to obtain all the information. 
In this paper, we realize a flexible access control scheme 
that reduces the operators’ waiting time for decryption. There 
will be a pre-specified threshold value that is set by the system 
according to the actual needs. Assume that in the transaction 
period TP, there are k RUs generating their information and 
preparing to upload. They first perform the secret sharing 
scheme, the time we denote as RUsST , and then the encryption 
time for a single RU is mET ; the time that CA solves the secret 
sharing polynomials is denoted as CADST . kTP denotes the 
time that k RUs prepares to upload their ciphertexts. Note that 
kTP TP . In the remaining time, other users can continue to 
submit information. The encryption time of k RUs is, 
 
3 k RUs m CAT TP ST ET DST= + + +                  
(27) 
  
When AOs require decryption, they will first solve the 
secret sharing polynomials, and then decrypt the ciphertexts. 
The decryption time is,  
3 ' CD k mT DST DT = +                            
(28) 
Compared with those two schemes, our scheme introduces a 
semi-trusted CA to assist with encryption. Without adding too 
much computational overhead, we shorten the waiting time for 
AO that allows them to request for decryption 
after 3 3( )T T TP , which does not affect the decryption of 
subsequent ciphertexts generated in kTP TP− . 
 
B.  Experimental results 
According to the numerical analysis, without the 
consideration of TP, we first only compare the 
encryption/decryption time of our scheme with those two 
traditional schemes mentioned above, which are denoted as 
Scheme 1 and Scheme 2. 
In the first two experiments, assume that the total number of 
RUs is 100 and the size of bid information is 100KB. As the 
number of RUs grows, this experiment primarily shows the 
time consuming comparison among these tree schemes. 
 
 
Fig.3a Comparison of the encryption time among 
Scheme 1, Scheme 2 and our Scheme, when the 
number of RUs rises. 
 
Fig.3d Comparison of the decryption time among 
Scheme 1, Scheme 2 and our Scheme, when the 
size of information rises. 
 
Fig.3b Comparison of the decryption time among 
Scheme 1, Scheme 2 and our Scheme, when the 
number of RUs rises. 
 
Fig.3e Comparison of the encryption time among 
Scheme 1, Scheme 2 and our Scheme, when the 
number of attributes rises. 
 
Fig.3c Comparison of the encryption time among 
Scheme 1, Scheme 2 and our Scheme, when the 
size of information rises. 
 
Fig.3f Comparison of the encryption time among 
Scheme 1, Scheme 2 and our Scheme, when the 
number of attributes rises. 
 
From Fig.3a, we can find that, as the number of RUs rises, 
the time overhead of Scheme 1 and our Scheme is growing 
linearly, while Scheme 2 is approximately flat. In Scheme 1, a 
trusted CA is in charge of encrypting all of the RUs’ 
information; this means that the amount of information that 
needs to be encrypted increases with the number of RUs. In 
Scheme 1, the RUs only encrypt their information 
independently; they are not affected by the number of RUs. In 
our scheme, most of the computational overhead arises on the 
CA’s side, as it is responsible for solving the secret sharing 
polynomials. Although the graph shows a large amount of time 
overhead, when compared with the transaction period, it 
significantly shortens the AOs’ waiting time. 
In Fig.3b, unlike in the case of encryption, the time overhead 
of Scheme 2 is obviously higher than ours and Scheme 1. As 
Scheme 2 requires AOs to decrypt the ciphertexts repeatedly, 
the computation overhead grows linearly with the number of 
RUs. Similarly, the computation overhead of Scheme 1 and our 
Scheme also grows slightly linearly with number of RUs. In 
Scheme 1, the ciphertext size is linearly correlated with the 
number of RUs. In our scheme, a polynomial of the highest 
power related to the number of RUs needs to be solved first. 
But, the growth is still significantly lower than that of Scheme 2. 
Both of the two schemes require only one decryption by the 
AOs. 
In the next two schemes, let the number of RUs be 20. As the 
size of information grows, this experiment mainly shows the 
time consuming comparison among these three schemes. 
Then, we consider how the time changes when the size of the 
information grows. The experiment result is shown in Fig.3.c. 
The time overhead of Scheme 1 is most affected by the size of 
information, which is similar to the situation of Fig.3.a. 
Compared with Scheme 2, the time overhead of ours is greater, 
as our scheme first requires the construction of the secret 
sharing scheme. 
However, the difference is significant during decryption 
showed in Fig.3d. The computational overhead of our Scheme 
is closer to that of Scheme 1. As in Scheme 2, AOs have to 
decrypt the ciphertexts repeatedly to obtain all of the 
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information. But, in Scheme 1 and our Scheme, the decryption 
will be performed by the AOs only once. 
Another factor affecting encryption time is the number of 
attributes. In the last two experiments, we let the size of 
information be 1MB and the number of RUs be 20. As the 
number of the attributes grows, this experiment primarily 
shows the time consuming comparison among these three 
schemes. 
Compared to the experiments before, we can find that they 
are similar to each other. From Fig.3.e, it shows that all of the 
computation overheads of these three schemes grow linearly, 
while our scheme and Scheme 2 are obviously superior to 
Scheme 1. 
In Fig.3f, obviously, the computation overhead of our 
scheme is closer to that of scheme 1. Repeated decryption 
operations take up a large amount of time in Scheme 2. But, in 
Scheme 1 and our scheme, the decryption will be performed by 
the AOs only once. 
What we can draw from the above experimental results is 
that, in terms of computational overhead, we make a 
compromise between Scheme 1 and Scheme 2. In both 
encryption and decryption, our scheme shows a relatively lower 
computation overhead. Additionally, with the consideration of 
the previous numerical analysis, the proposed scheme shortens 
the time for the AOs to request and decrypt efficiently.  
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In a scenario where the RUs upload the individual trading 
and bid information in the Smart Grid with RERs, we analyze 
the challenges regarding the security and system efficiency, and 
propose a flexible access control scheme with data delay 
tolerance for the Smart Grid with RERs. The proposed scheme 
makes it possible that, even within a fixed transaction period, 
the AOs can still access parts of the ciphertexts instead of 
waiting until the period is over. This will not affect the 
decryption of the remaining ciphertext. No matter how many 
ciphertexts the AOs get from the same smart community, they 
only need to be decrypted once. We present the security 
analysis to demonstrate that the proposed scheme meets the 
security requirements. In the performance evaluation section, 
we compare two other schemes with ours, which shows that the 
proposed scheme is efficient and practical. 
In the future work, first, we will investigate how to further 
improve the system efficiency. Due to the limitation of 
traditional KP-ABE [5], we will try to realize the attribute 
revocation or integrate CP-ABE [21] and Proxy Re-encryption 
Encryption in the following scheme. Second, it is an interesting 
future direction to study if the proposed scheme could be 
integrated into some unified framework in Smart Grid (e.g. A 
Unified Framework for Secured Energy Resource Management 
in Smart Grid [15]). 
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